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Abstract—Developing correct, scalable, and fault-tolerant dis-
tributed databases is hard and labor-intensive. The increasing
complexity of such systems under modern cloud infrastructures,
e.g., geo-replicated multi-partitioned datacenters, further limits
the number of design alternatives that can be explored in
practice. There is therefore a need for the formal analysis of
both their qualitative properties, e.g., data consistency, and their
quantitative properties, e.g., latency, at an early design stage.
In this paper we use formal modeling and both standard
and statistical model checking techniques to explore the de-
sign space of replicated RAMP (Read Atomic Multi-Partition)
transactions for geo-replicated databases. Specifically, we develop
in Maude formal, executable specifications of three replicated
RAMP designs, two by the RAMP developers and one by us, and
analyze their data consistency properties. We further transform
the Maude models into probabilistic rewrite theories for statistical
model checking w.r.t. performance properties. Our results: (i) are
consistent with the conjectures made by the RAMP developers;
(ii) uncover our promising new design that not only provides
all crucial data consistency guarantees but also outperforms the
other design alternatives.
I. INTRODUCTION
Designing reliable and high-performance distributed sys-
tems is significantly hard and labor-intensive. Modern cloud
databases that typically run in a geo-replicated environment
for availability, scalability, and fault tolerance, have further
increased this complexity. For instance, integrating a replica-
tion mechanism with strong consistency like Paxos into a dis-
tributed database may impose a high latency cost, while more
efficient mechanisms with weaker consistency may be unable
to offer strong data consistency guarantees. This provides a
challenge that designers must both assure and balance data
consistency and performance to arrive at mature designs.
To evaluate and improve a system design the only available
option is to touch a large code base. This often requires
intensive manual efforts, has a high risk of introducing new
bugs, and is not repeatable. In practice, very few designs can
be explored in this way. For example, in the case of designing
replicated RAMP (Read Atomic Multi-Partition) transactions,
all designs were only sketched out but not implemented [4].
Formal methods have been advocated to develop and an-
alyze high-level designs of distributed systems in general
and cloud databases in particular. One representative formal
ecosystem that has shown promise in meeting the above chal-
lenges is Maude [9], a rewriting-logic-based formal framework
for executable specification and a high-performance analysis
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toolkit for object-based distributed systems [6], [15], [16],
[24], [29]. In particular, Maude’s LTL model checker and
the PVeStA statistical model checker [3] have been used
to analyze, often for the first time, both correctness and
performance of high-level designs of a wide range of state-
of-the-art industrial and academic cloud databases such as
Apache Cassandra, Google’s Megastore, RAMP, Walter, and
ROLA. Model-based performance predictions using PVeStA
have shown good correspondence with implementations-based
evaluations under realistic deployments for Cassandra, RAMP,
Walter, and ROLA [13], [14], [19], [22].
Our Goal. We anticipate that all correct and high-performance
distributed databases must undergo both qualitative and quan-
titative analyses to obtain desirable data consistency and
performance guarantees. Moreover, these analyses should be
performed at an early design stage to avoid design errors that
may be orders of magnitude more costly to eliminate at the
implementation stage. In the spirit of achieving this goal, we
present the formal designs and analyses of replicated RAMP
transactions.
Status Quo of RAMP. The RAMP transaction system, pro-
posed by Bailis et al. [4], is one of the most promising
databases that bridge the gap between efficiency (low latency)
and strong consistency (correctness) in a distributed setting
(the CAP theorem [7]). RAMP offers a correctness property
called “Read Atomicity” (RA) which ensures that a given
transaction’s updates are either all visible or not visible at
all, to other transactions.
The RAMP paper [4] briefly mentions two designs for data
replication, but without any details or formal analysis. Given
the importance of data replication in modern cloud databases
and of making RAMP a production-capable system in geo-
replicated environment, there is therefore a clear need for for-
mally specifying and analyzing replicated RAMP transactions.
Our Contributions. A main contribution in this paper is
to develop in Maude formal, executable specifications of
three replicated RAMP designs (Section IV), two by the
RAMP developers [4] and one by us (Section III). We then
use Maude’s LTL model checker and the CAT tool [20] to
analyze these specifications against data consistency properties
such as the crucial RA that RAMP was built on and the
prevalent session guarantee, called read your writes [28]. Our
model checking results show that our own design satisfies all
expected consistency properties (Section V).
A second key contribution is the uncovering of our promis-
ing design with highly desirable performance compared to
those proposed by the RAMP developers. To do so, we
further transform the above untimed, non-probabilistic, and
nondeterministic Maude models that are used for standard
model checking w.r.t. logical properties into timed and purely
probabilistic models for statistical model checking (SMC)
[27], [31] w.r.t. performance properties. We subject the three
designs to realistic transaction workloads with a wider range
of experimental parameters. Our SMC analysis results shows
that our own design incurs less transaction latency than the
other designs under all experimented workloads (Section VI).
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. RAMP Transactions
To improve scalability and availability, large-scale cloud
databases divide data into partitions that can be managed and
accessed separately. Nonetheless, providing strong consistency
guarantees for multi-partition transactions typically incurs high
latency. Thus, trade-offs that combine efficiency with weaker
transactional guarantees for such transactions are needed.
Bailis et al. [4] propose a database isolation model,
called read atomicity (RA), and Read Atomic Multi-Partition
(RAMP) transactions, providing efficient multi-partition oper-
ations guaranteeing RA. For instance, in a social networking
scenario, if Batman and Robin become “friends” in one
transaction, then other transactions should not see that Robin
is a friend of Batman but that Batman is not a friend of Robin:
Either both relationships are visible to others or neither is.
Three RAMP algorithms, RAMP-Fast, RAMP-Small, and
RAMP-Hybrid, are proposed in [4], offering different trade-
offs between the size of a message payload and performance.
We focus on RAMP-Fast as both design strategies for repli-
cating RAMP transactions (Section II-B), as well as our own
design alternative (Section III), are based on it.
RAMP Writes: To guarantee that all partitions perform a
transaction successfully or that none do, RAMP performs two-
phase writes by using the two-phase commit protocol (2PC):
In the prepare phase, each timestamped write is sent to its
partition, which adds the write to its local database. In the
commit phase, each partition updates an index which contains
the highest-timestamped committed version of each item.
RAMP Reads: Read transactions proceed by first fetching the
highest-timestamped committed version of each requested data
item (or key) from the corresponding partition (by the first-
round get message), and then deciding if they have missed
any version that has been prepared but not yet committed. The
timestamp and the metadata from each version read produces a
mapping from items to timestamps that represent the highest-
timestamped write for each transaction, appearing in the first-
round read set. If the reader has a lower timestamp version than
indicated in the mapping for that item, a second-round read
(or get message) will be issued to fetch the missing version.
Once all the missing versions have been fetched, the client
can return the resulting set of versions, which include both
the first-round reads as well as any missing versions fetched
in the second-round reads.
B. Replicating RAMP Transactions
Replication is critical for improving data availability and
system fault tolerance. However, the RAMP algorithms [4] do
not take data replication into account. The paper [4] briefly dis-
cusses two design strategies for replicating RAMP transactions
in a multi-datacenter/cluster setting, where database partitions
are located in separate clusters in possibly geo-graphically
remote regions. Nonetheless, only high-level designs are pro-
vided without any concrete algorithm or formal analysis.
Prepare-F HA RAMP (PHR): A client sets a minimum
durability for its writes, i.e., the number of failures F it wishes
to survive. When writing, the client issues a prepare request
to all clusters and waits until it receives a successful response
from F+1 partitions before starting to commit the transaction.
Once all partitions have received the prepare request via, e.g.,
an asynchronous callback on the client, they commit the writes
autonomously.
Sticky HA RAMP (SHR): Each client is assigned to its own
cluster. Instead of issuing prepare and commit requests to all
database replicas, the client issues them to its assigned cluster
before forwarding them to other clusters for replication. The
client can commit the transaction once it has performed the
RAMP protocol only in its local cluster.
C. Rewriting Logic, Maude, and PVeStA
Rewriting Logic and Maude. Maude [9] is a rewriting-
logic-based executable formal specification language and high-
performance analysis tool for object-based distributed systems.
A Maude module specifies a rewrite theory [23] (Σ, E ∪
A,R), where:
• Σ is an algebraic signature, i.e., a set of sorts, subsorts,
and function symbols.
• (Σ, E ∪A) is a membership equational logic theory [9],
with E a set of possibly conditional equations and
membership axioms, and A a set of equational axioms
such as associativity, commutativity, and identity, so that
equational deduction is performed modulo the axioms A.
The theory (Σ, E ∪ A) specifies the system’s states as
members of an algebraic data type.
• R is a collection of labeled conditional rewrite rules
[l] : t −→ t′ if cond , with l the label, that specify the
system’s local transitions.
Equations and rewrite rules are introduced with, respec-
tively, keywords eq, or ceq for conditional equations, and
rl and crl. An equation f(t1, . . . , tn) = t with the owise
(“otherwise”) attribute can be applied to a subterm f(. . .)
only if no other equation with lefthand side f(u1, . . . , un)
can be applied. Maude also provides standard parameterized
data types (sets, maps, etc.) that can be instantiated (and
renamed). For example, pr SET{Nat} * (sort Set{Nat}
to Nats) . defines a set of natural numbers of sort Nats.
A class declaration class C | att1 : s1, ...,
attn : sn declares a class C of objects with attributes att1
to attn of sorts s1 to sn. An object instance of class C is
represented as a term <O : C | att1 : val1, . . . , attn : valn >,
where O, of sort Oid, is the object’s identifier, and where val1
to valn are the current values of the attributes att1 to attn. A
message is a term of sort Msg. A system state is modeled as
a term of the sort Configuration, and has the structure of
a multiset made up of objects and messages.
The dynamic behavior of a system is axiomatized by
specifying each of its transition patterns by a rewrite rule.
For example, the rule (with label l)
rl [l] : m(O,w)
< O : C | a1 : x, a2 : O’, a3 : z >
=>
< O : C | a1 : x + w, a2 : O’, a3 : z >
m’(O’,x) .
defines a family of transitions in which a message m(O,w) is
read and consumed by an object O of class C, whose attribute
a1 is changed to x + w, and a new message m’(O’,x) is
generated. Attributes whose values do not change and do not
affect the next state (e.g., a3) need not be mentioned in a rule.
Statistical Model Checking and PVeStA. Probabilistic dis-
tributed systems can be modeled as probabilistic rewrite
theories [2] with rules of the form
[l] : t(−→x ) −→ t′(−→x ,−→y ) if cond(−→x )
with probability −→y := π(−→x )
where the term t′ has additional new variables −→y disjoint from
the variables −→x in the term t. For a given matching instance of
the variables −→x there can be many ways to instantiate the extra
variables −→y . The values of these variables −→y are sampled
according to the probability distribution π(−→x ), which depends
on the matching instance of −→x .
Statistical model checking [27], [31] is a formal approach
to analyzing probabilistic systems against temporal logic prop-
erties. It can verify a property up to a user-specified level
of confidence by running Monte-Carlo simulations of the
system model. In this paper we use the PVESTA tool [3] to
statistically model check purely probabilistic systems against
properties expressed by QUATEX formulas [2]. The expected
value of a QUATEX expression is iteratively evaluated w.r.t.
two parameters α and δ provided as input by sampling until
the size of (1-α)100% confidence interval is bounded by δ,
where the result of evaluating a formula is a real number.
III. THE SHR-FASTER DESIGN
We have developed an alternative design for replicating
RAMP transactions, called SHR-Faster. It shares the same
multi-cluster setting with SHR, i.e., the “stickiness” between
clients and partitions within a cluster, as well as the methods
for processing writes.
The novelty lies in how SHR-Faster processes reads: a
read transaction is committed in exactly one round-trip time
(RTT) instead of two RTTs required by RAMP-Fast and
therefore SHR, with racing/concurrent writes. The key idea
is to compute an RA-consistent snapshot of the database in
terms of timestamped versions prior to the first-round reads.
Specifically, the client maintains, for each key K, the last seen
timestamp Tls and associated timestamp Tmd for the metadata
(i.e., sibling keys). Requesting the version with the maximum
of Tls and all those Tmds where K is a sibling key always
guarantees RA. The client can run a periodic stabilization
protocol to update Tls and Tmd for each key, or piggyback
all information via regular RAMP messages.
Since each read in SHR-Faster needs only one RTT, it
should incur lower transaction latency than the other repli-
cation designs. Regarding data consistency, SHR-Faster is
expected to guarantee the essential read atomicity, as well as
an important session guarantee, called read your writes (RYW)
[28], advocated by many industrial database applications [8].
With all these interesting properties, SHR-Faster would be
an attractive option for replicating read atomic multi-partition
transactions where RA, RYW, and low latency are highly
desired.
IV. FORMALIZING DESIGNS
Designs are formalized in an object-oriented style, where
the state is a multiset consisting of a number of partition
objects, each modeling a partition of the entire database, a
number of client objects, each executing transactions formal-
ized also as objects residing inside the client, and a number
of messages traveling between the objects. Regarding system
dynamics, we focus on the designs’ differences. The entire
executable Maude specifications are available at [1].
A. Data Types, Objects, and Messages
Basic Data Types. A version is modeled as a 4-tuple
<key,value,timestamp,metadata> (of sort Version)
consisting of the key, its value, and the version’s timestamp
and metadata. A timestamp is modeled as a pair <id,sqn>
consisting of an object identifier and a local sequence num-
ber that together uniquely identify a version. Metadata are
modeled as a set of keys, indicating, for each key, the
sibling keys written in the same transaction. For example, if
a transaction writes keys k1, k2, and k3, then the sibling keys
of k1, as the metadata, are the set {k2, k3}. The partition-
side data structure versions is modeled as a set of versions
denoted by Set{Version} that instantiates Maude’s built-
in parameterized container sets on the sort Version. We also
use another container maps to define latest and latestCommit
as Map{Key,Timestamp} mapping keys to timestamps.
Classes and Objects. A partition stores parts of the entire
database. We formalize it as an object instance of the following
class Partition:
class Partition | versions : Set{Version},
latestCommit : Map{Key,Timestamp} .
where the partitioned database consists of a set of versions
for each key stored locally. The partition also retains the
timestamp of the latest committed version for each key.
A transaction is modeled as an object instance of class Txn:
class Txn |
operations : List{Operation}, txnSqn : Nat,
votes : Set{Oid}, commits : Set{Oid},
1stReads : Set{Oid}, 2ndReads : Set{Oid},
latest : Map{Key,Timestamp},
readset : Set{kvPair}, writeset : Set{kvPair} .
where the attribute operations denotes the transac-
tion’s operations, with each of the form read(key)
or write(key,value). The attribute readset, resp.
writeset, denotes the <key,value> pairs fetched, resp.
written, by the read, resp. write, operations of the transaction.
The attribute votes stores the votes from the partitions
which participate in the 2PC protocol. The remaining attributes
commits, 1stReads, and 2ndReads store, respectively,
the partitions from which the client is awaiting committed
acks, first-round get replies, and second-round get replies.
A client, modeled as an object instance of class Client,
is delegated to process transactions:
class Client |
sqn : Nat, queue : List{Object},
executing : Set{Object}, committed : List{Object}
dc : Oid, last : Map{Key,Pair} .
The attributes queue, executing, and committed store
the transaction object(s) which are waiting to be executed,
currently executing, and committed, respectively. Concurrently
executing transactions can be modeled by multiple clients with
each holding a currently executing transaction. The attribute
dc refers to the datacenter where the client is co-located.
The attribute last, specific to SHR-Faster, maps each key
to the pair <timestamp,metadata> of its latest version that
the client has seen.
The state also contains a “table” object of class Table
mapping each key to the partitions storing the key (called the
key’s replicas), and each datacenter to its partitions.
The following shows an example initial state of sort
Configuration (with some parts replaced by ‘...’) with
two clients, c1 and c2, queuing, respectively, two and one
transactions. Read transaction t1 has two read operations
on, respectively, two keys k1 and k2. Write transaction t2
consists of two write operations, with each writing a value
(e.g., "TASE") to a key (e.g., k2). Transaction t3 is a
transaction of a single read on key k4. The key space is
split by two partitions p1 (resp. p3) and p2 (resp. p4) and
replicated in two datacenters, e.g., key k1 is replicated at
partitions p1 and p4 that are located in datacenters d1 and
d2, respectively. Each partition is initialized accordingly; in
particular, for each key, the value is the empty string, the
timestamp is null, and the metadata is an empty set:
op init : -> Configuration .
eq init =
< c1 : Client | queue :
(< t1 : Txn | operations : (read(k1) read(k2)),
txnSqn : 0, latest : empty,
votes : empty, commits : empty,
1stReads : empty, 2ndReads : empty,
readset : empty, writeset : empty >
< t2 : Txn | operations : (write(k2,"TASE")
write(k3,"ECNU")), ... >),
sqn : 0, executing : empty, committed : nil,
dc : d1, last : empty >
< c2 : Client | queue :
< t3 : Txn | operations : read(k4), ... >, ... >
< p1 : Partition | versions : (< k1, "", null, empty >,
< k4, "", null, empty >),
latest : empty >
< p2 : Partition | ... > < p3 : Partition | ... >
< p4 : Partition | ... >
< t : Table |
replicas: (k1 |-> (p1, p4), k2 |-> (p2, p3),
k3 |-> (p2, p4), k4 |-> (p1, p3)),
clusters: (d1 |-> (p1, p2), d2 |-> (p3, p4)) >
Messages. A message has the form (to receiver from
sender : mc). The terms sender and receiver are
object identifiers. The term mc is the message con-
tent, having the form of either get(txn,key,ts,dc),
a get message, sent to the corresponding partition lo-
cated in datacenter dc, requesting key’s version with
the timestamp ts; reply(txn,key,val,ts,md), the re-
turned version from the partition for first-round get request;
reply2(txn,key,val,ts,md), the respond to second-
round get request; prepare(txn,key,val,ts,md,dc), the
version sent from a write transaction to the corresponding
partition in datacenter dc; vote(txn,vote), the reply to
the corresponding prepare message where vote denotes the
partition’s decision on whether it can commit the transaction;
commit(txn,ts,dc), the demand for committing the ver-
sion with timestamp ts; or ack(txn), the acknowledgment
of committing the transaction from the partition. Note that
SHR-Faster only use reply messages for transaction reads
as no second-round read is needed.
B. Formalizing System Dynamics
We have formalized the dynamic behaviors of all three
designs using rewrite rules. In this section we focus on the core
difference (denoted by the colored parts in italics in a rule),
that typically lies in the client-side methods, between PHR and
SHR w.r.t. processing write transactions, and between SHR
and SHR-Faster w.r.t. processing reads.1 We exemplify each
case with one rule, and refer to [1] for the remaining rules
including the partition-side methods.
1) Processing Writes: The following rule shows how an
SHR client proceeds once the prepare phase ends (checked by
the all predicate if all vote messages have been received):
crl [rcv-vote-shr] :
(from O’ to O : vote(TID,yes))
< T : Table | replicas : RS, cluster : DS >
< O : Client | dc : DC, executing :
< TID : Txn | operations : OPS, txnSqn : N,
votes : VS, commits : CS > >
=>
< T : Table | >
< O : Client | executing :
< TID : Txn | votes : VS’, commits : CS,
(if all(VS’) then
addCommitsOneDc(OPS,RS,DS,DC)




if VS’ := remove(O’,VS) .
1We do not include variable declarations, but follow the Maude convention
that variables are written in (all) capital letters.
The client starts to commit the executing transaction
by generating the commit messages for all the partici-
pants involved in the 2PC protocol in its datacenter (by
genCommitsOneDc). The addCommitsOneDc function
computes the set of those participants’ identifiers that are
added to commits. The remove function updates the client’s
waiting list for votes.
Modifications for PHR. Instead of all votes in the co-located
cluster, a PHR client collects a majority of responses (checked
by the quorum predicate) from all replicas, including re-
mote ones, before propagating the commit messages (by the
genCommitsAllDc function):
crl [rcv-vote-phr] :
(from O’ to O : vote(TID,yes))
< T : Table | replicas : RS, cluster : DS >
< O : Client | executing :
< TID : Txn | operations : OPS, txnSqn : N,
votes : VS, commits : CS >
committed : TXNS, dc : DC >
=>
< T : Table | >
(if quorum(VS’)
then < O : Client | executing : empty,
committed : (TXNS
< TID : Txn | votes : VS’, commits : (CS,
addCommitsAllDc(OPS,RS,DS,DC)) >) >
genCommitsAllDc(O,TID,N,OPS,RS,DS,DC)
else < O : Client | executing :
< TID : Txn | votes : VS’ > > fi)
if VS’ := remove(O’,VS) .
The corresponding replicas are added to commits, from
which the client awaits the ack messages. Notice that, unlike
SHR, PHR then commits the transaction by moving it from
executing to committed; the client can therefore issue
the next transaction in the queue.
2) Processing Reads: The key difference between SHR and
its optimization SHR-Faster lies in how a client reacts to the
first-round reads. In SHR, upon receiving a reply, the client
checks whether all first-round responses have been collected
(by the all predicate): the client then issues second-round
get messages (by gen2ndReads) if any writes are missing;
otherwise, it continues to wait for the remaining first-round
reply messages:
crl [rcv-1st-reply-shr] :
(from O’ to O : reply(TID,K,V,TS,MD))
< T : Table | replicas : RS, cluster : DS >
< O : Client | dc : DC, executing :
< TID : Txn | operations : OPS, readset : RS,
latest : VL, 1stReads : 1ST,
2ndReads : 2ND > >
=>
< T : Table | >
< O : Client | executing :
< TID : Txn | readSet : RS’, latest : VL’,
1stReads: 1ST’, 2ndReads : 2ND,
(if all(1ST’) then
2ndPars(VL’,RS’,RS,DS,DC)




if RS’ := RS, < K,V,TS,MD > /\ VL’ := lat(VL,MD,TS)
/\ 1ST’ := remove(O’,1ST) .
The 2ndPars function computes the corresponding partitions
(possibly none) involved in the second-round communication.
The lat function updates the current key-timestamp map-
pings VL with the latest committed timestamp received (i.e.,
TS), which are then used to compute the missing writes. The
client also updates its readset accordingly (i.e., RS’).
The SHR client commits a read transaction (moved from
executing to committed) if both 1stReads and
2ndReads are empty, indicating that all first- and second-
round replies have been received:
rl [rtxn-committed-shr] :
< O : Client | committed : TXNS, executing :
< TID : Txn | 1stReads : empty,
2ndReads : empty > >
=>
< O : Client | committed : (TXNS < TID : Txn | >),
executing : empty > .
Modifications for SHR-Faster. A read transaction in SHR-
Faster is committed in one RTT if all first-round reply
messages have been collected:
rl [rcv-1st-reply-shr-faster] :
(from O’ to O : reply(TID,K,V,TS,MD))
< O : Client | last : KP, committed : TXNS,
executing :
< TID : Txn | readset : RS, 1stReads : 1ST > >
=>
if all(1ST’) then
< O : Client | last : last(KP,< K,V,TS,MD >),
committed : (TXNS
< TID : Txn | readset : (RS, < K,V,TS,MD >),
1stReads : remove(O’,1ST) >),
executing : empty >
else
< O : Client | executing :
< TID : Txn | readset : (RS, < K,V,TS,MD >),
1stReads : remove(O’,1ST) > > fi .
where, unlike SHR, no second-round get request is generated.
The client also updates last with the received version for
computing RA-consistent snapshots of the database (see [1]
for details).
V. MODEL CHECKING CORRECTNESS PROPERTIES
This section shows our formal analysis of all three designs
against three data consistency properties using the CAT tool
[20] and Maude’s built-in model checker. In particular, we
formalize in Maude the read your writes session guarantee
which CAT cannot handle.
A. The CAT Model Checker
CAT [20] is a Maude-based tool for model checking data
consistency properties of distributed transaction systems like
SHR specified in Maude. It currently supports nine transac-
tional consistency properties, including RA and the weaker
consistency property read committed (RC) used as the default
isolation level by almost all SQL databases [11].
B. Formalizing Read Your Writes
Read your writes [28] guarantees that the effects of all
writes performed by a client are visible to its subsequent reads.
We define RYW in Maude as a predicate over states as follows:
op ryw : Configuration -> Bool .
*** case 1: read even earlier write in the same session
eq ryw(< O : Client | committed : (TXNS1
< TID1 | writeset : (< K,V,TS,MD >, WS) > TXNS2
< TID2 | writeset : (< K,V’,TS’,MD’ >, WS’) > TXNS3
< TID3 | readset : (< K,V,TS’’,MD’’ >, RS) > TXNS4) >
CONF) = false .
*** case 2: read earlier write from a different session
ceq ryw(< O : Client | committed : (TXNS1
< TID1 | writeset : (< K,V,TS,MD >, WS) > TXNS2) >
< O’ : Client | committed : (TXNS3
< TID2 | writeset : (< K,V’,TS’,MD’ >, WS’) > TXNS4
< TID3 | readset : (< K,V,TS’’,MD’’ >, RS) > TXNS5) >
CONF) = false if TS < TS’ .
*** case 3: read initial value
eq ryw(< O : Client | committed : (TXNS1
< TID1 | writeset : (< K,V,TS,MD >, WS) > TXNS2
< TID2 | readset : (< K,"",TS’,MD’ >, RS) > TXNS3) >
CONF) = false .
*** remaining cases
eq ryw(CONF) = true [owise] .
The predicate ryw analyzes RYW by checking (the state)
whether there was a “bad situation” in which a committed
transaction had fetched an RYW-inconsistent value. More
specifically, we consider three such cases:
1) Instead of returning the previous write in the same
session, a committed transaction TID3 reads an even
earlier write (by matching the key K and the value V) in
the same session (the first equation).
2) A committed transaction TID3 fetches a write from
a different session, which has an earlier version than
TID3’s previous write in the same session (the second
conditional equation).
3) Despite a previous write in the same session, a commit-
ted transaction TID2 returns the initial value (the third
equation).
The fourth equation covers all the remaining (RYW-consistent)
cases. Note that CONF (of sort Configuration) denotes
the rest of the entire configuration (or state) in the first three
equations.
C. Model Checking Analysis
We have applied CAT and Maude’s built-in model checker
to three Maude models of the designs against RA, RC, and
RYW, respectively.
TABLE I
MODEL CHECKING RESULTS FOR CONSISTENCY PROPERTIES. “X”, RESP.
“×”, REFERS TO SATISFYING, RESP. VIOLATING THE PROPERTY.
Maude Model LOC # rules Consistency Property
RC RA RYW
PHR 845 14 X X ×
SHR 894 14 X X X
SHR-Faster 887 12 X X X
Table I summarizes our model checking results. All three
designs satisfy RA, as well as RC. Regarding RYW, our
analysis shows that only PHR does not satisfy the property.
The counterexample obtained by analyzing the initial state





shows that the read operations from c1 return
the values written by c2’s first write transaction
write(k1,11) write(k2,54) that was issued before
c1’s first write transaction. The reason is that a PHR read
transaction could access the versions written before its last
write transaction commits; PHR enables “fast” commit of
writes once the client collects a majority of responses from
all the participants.
We have run CAT with automatically generated different
initial states [20], with up to 6 transactions, 2 operations per
transaction, 3 clients, 6 partitions, 3 datacenters, 3 keys, and
3 replicas per key. We have also employed these initial states
in our analysis of RYW with Maude’s built-in model checker.
Each analysis took about one hour (worst case) to execute on
a 3.3 GHz Dual-Core Intel Core i7 CPU with 16GB memory.
VI. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS USING SMC
Our qualitative analysis in Section V investigates the desired
data consistency guarantees—SHR-Faster, as well as SHR,
satisfies all three properties.
SHR-Faster must therefore outperform SHR, as well as
PHR, to be an attractive design. In this section we use statisti-
cal model checking with PVeStA to compare the performance
of these designs in terms of average transaction latency.
A. Probabilistic Models
The models in Section IV are untimed, non-probabilistic,
and nondeterministic, which can be analyzed w.r.t. their logical
properties using model checking. To estimate the system
performance, we need to enrich the models with time and
probabilities and eliminate any nondeterminism. The trans-
formed models are therefore timed and purely probabilistic,
which can be subjected to SMC.
We follow the methodology in [2] by assigning to each
message a delay sampled from a continuous probability dis-
tribution so that the probability that two messages have the
same delay is 0. The framework [2] then guarantees no un-
quantified nondeterminism by firing a rewrite rule according to
the arrival of a message. The elapse of message delays, as well
as advancing the global clock, is maintained by a scheduler
object in the framework.
We exemplify with a (partition-side) rule how we have
transformed the untimed non-probabilistic rewrite rules to
the timed and probabilistic setting. In the transformed prob-
abilistic rule below, upon receiving the prepare message
at global time GT, the partition stores the associated version
< K,V,TS,MD > in its local database, and sends its vote
yes back with message delay D sampled from probability
distribution distr(−→x ):
rl [rcv-prep-prob] :
{GT, (to O from O’ : prepare(TID,K,V,TS,MD,DC))}




















































































Fig. 1. Statistical model checking analysis results for the comparison of three designs.
< O : Partition | versions : (VS, < K,V,TS,MD >) >
[D, (to O’ from O : vote(TID,yes))]
with probability D := distr(−→x ) .
where distr is parametric on −→x , the corresponding variables
in the lefthand side of the rule (see [20] for details). The
outgoing vote must then be consumed by receiver O’ when
time D elapses, i.e., at global time GT + D.
B. Extracting Transaction Latency Measures
PVeStA estimates the expected value of a QuaTEx expres-
sion on a run, up to a desired statistical confidence. Hence,
the key to performing SMC is to define a measure on system
runs. We then define a function on states that extracts the
latency metric from the system execution log recorded by a
monitor object (similar to the monitor defined in CAT [20];
see Section V). Specifically, the monitor stores important
information about each transaction, i.e., its ID, issue time, and
commit time. Thanks to the transformed rules, we can extract
timing information, e.g., the current global time, directly from
an incoming message (see rule rcv-prep-prob above).
We have modified the probabilistic models by updating the
monitor object whenever needed. See [1] for details.
C. Benchmark and Experimental Setup
To statistically analyze the designs’ performance, we imple-
ment in Maude a parametric workload generator that proba-
bilistically generates a different initial state for each simulation
in an SMC analysis. The parameters are: #clients (default: 50),
#clusters (default: 3), #partitions/cluster (default: 5), #keys
(default: 1k), #transactions (default: 400), #ops/transaction
(default: 2), %reads (default: 50), and key-access distribution2
(default: Zipfian [10]).
To mimic the real-world multi-datacenter environment, we
use the lognormal distribution for probabilistically sampling
message delays [5], which are further modulated linearly
according to the distance between the sender and receiver.
We employed 20 d430 Emulab machines [30], each with two
2.4 GHz 64-bit 8-Core E5-2630 processors, to parallelize SMC
with the PVeStA tool [3]. We set the statistical confidence level
to 95% and the size parameter to 0.01 for all our experiments.
2Key-access distribution is the probability that a read/write operation
accesses a certain data item.
D. SMC Analysis Results
We have subjected the transformed purely probabilistic
models to the above workload generator and PVeStA, and
performed three sets of experiments on measuring average
latency. Each SMC analysis took up to two hours (worst case)
to terminate. Each point in the plots represents the average of
three SMC results.
Fig. 1 depicts the average latency as a function of percentage
of reads, key-access distribution, and transaction size, respec-
tively. The plots show that our SHR-Faster design outperforms
SHR, which in turn outperforms PHR, for all parameter
combinations.
As shown in Fig. 1-(a), the latency for PHR tends to de-
crease significantly, starting from 10% reads, with increasing
reads in the mixed workload. The reason is that transactional
writing must wait for F+1 (in this case 2) responses from the
corresponding partitions, including at least one in the remote
cluster, while reads need not to due to the weak consistency
guarantee of read atomicity. The latency difference between
SHR-Faster and SHR becomes larger with more concurrent
writes (i.e., 50%–70% reads) as more second-round reads were
issued to fetched the missing writes in SHR.
Fig. 1-(b) plots the comparison under various key-access
distributions. With more frequent key accesses, i.e., Zipfian
and hotspot (80% operations on 20% keys [10]), the la-
tency difference is quite large as more second-round reads
were sent to possibly remote partitions. The same argument
applies to Fig. 1-(c) where increasing transaction size (i.e.,
#ops/transaction) leads to more remote communications.
VII. RELATED WORK
Maude for RAMP. In [17] we formalized RAMP and its
variants and used Maude model checking to analyze their
correctness properties. In [14] we modeled RAMP and its
extensions in probabilistic rewrite theories and employed SMC
to compare their performance. None of these RAMP-family
algorithms considers data replication that is indispensable in
modern distributed database systems. In contrast, this paper
focuses on replicated RAMP transactions and also introduces
our most promising replication design SHR-Faster. Moreover,
this paper follows a more general methodology based on
formal modeling with rewrite rules that are further transformed
into probabilistic rewrite rules so that both qualitative and
quantitative properties are investigated.
Maude for Distributed Databases. Existing work [12], [18],
[19], [26] specifies and model checks various distributed trans-
action systems that provide other types of data consistency
properties, as opposed to read atomicity and read your writes
considered in this paper. The paper [12] estimate Google’s
Megastore using randomized Real-Time Maude simulations.
However, this methodology cannot offer any measure of
statistical confidence in the estimations. The papers [13], [21]
show how the NoSQL key-value store Cassandra has been
formally analyzed for both data consistency and performance
properties using Maude and PVeStA. Cassandra only supports
single read/write operation, while transactional consistency
properties such as RA are more complex to be analyzed.
Formal Methods for Distributed Databases. Other formal
methods have been used in the design of distributed databases.
One representative is TLA+ and its model checker TLC
that have been used in both industry, e.g., Amazon’s cloud
computing infrastructure [25], and academia, e.g., the TAPIR
protocol [32]. In contrast to our work, they employ formal
methods only for correctness checking but could not run any
performance measurement as complained in [25].
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have explored in this paper three designs for replicated
RAMP transactions by formal modeling with Maude rewrite
rules and probabilistic rewrite theories, and by the analysis
with standard model checking for data consistency proper-
ties and PVeStA statistical model checker for performance
measurements, respectively. Substantial knowledge has been
obtained about the design space. In particular, we have iden-
tified a promising design with sticky clients and one round-
trip communication for transactional reads. We have shown
that our design not only provides the crucial RA and RYW
consistency guarantees, but also outperforms the other design
alternatives w.r.t. transaction latency under various workloads.
A natural next step is to confirm our model-based SMC
predictions of the designs with their implementation-based
evaluations under the actual deployment in the cloud.
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[18] Si Liu, Peter Csaba Ölveczky, Keshav Santhanam, Qi Wang, Indranil
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